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This paper investigates why the homeowner’s expectation about the sale price of 
a house deviates from its market price. This paper has two distinct contributions. 
First, we argue that sale price expectations are individual specific. Omitting this 
individual effect leads to biased hedonic estimates. As a result, hedonic estimates 
conditional on individual characteristics are preferred. Second, we economically 
interpret the individual effect in terms of inaccuracy of homeowners and a specific 
type of price setting behaviour (“fishing for a relatively high selling price”). In 
particular, we focus on the role of mortgage commitment, which is measured by the 
loan-to-income ratio. We argue that homeowners with a higher loan-to-income ratio 
are less likely to move. Consequently, they incur a low opportunity cost of fishing. 
They are also less inclined to search. As a result, homeowners with a higher loan-to-
income ratio might have more incentive to fish for a higher sale price, but they may 
also be less accurate with regard to the market price. Our estimates confirm these 
two hypotheses. 
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1. Introduction 
The expectation of a homeowner regarding the sale price of his house does not 
always equal the market price. This paper investigates two reasons why both prices 
might  deviate:  inaccuracy  of  the  homeowner  and  price  setting  behaviour.  The 
contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold.  
First, we show that standard hedonic estimates will be biased when the sale 
price that is expected by the homeowner (the so-called own house price valuation) is 
used as dependent variable. In particular, we argue that sale price expectations are 
individual-specific.  Hence,  the  omission  of  the  individual-specific  effects  leads  to 
biased hedonic estimates if the individual-specific effects and house-specific effects 
are correlated. We use a novel argument to explain this correlation. Specifically, a 
relationship between individual-specific effects and house-specific effects can be the 
result of the sorting of households across particular types of houses. Our explanation 
differs from previous studies, which argue that hedonic estimates will be biased if the 
deviation of the own house price valuation from the market price is house specific 
(e.g. Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez, 1986; Goodman and Ittner, 1992; Kiel and 
Zabel, 1999). In those studies, the role of individual characteristics, specifically in 
relation to the bias in hedonic estimates, remains unclear. 
  The  second  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  economically  interpret  the 
individual effect. We relate this effect to inaccuracy, as well as “fishing” for a higher 
price, which is a specific type of price setting behaviour from the seller. Most of the 
previous studies that investigate the validity of the own house price valuation for 
hedonic purposes interpret any discrepancy of the own house price valuation from the 
market price as bias, inaccuracy or measurement error (e.g. Kish and Lansing, 1954; 
Kain  and  Quigley,  1972;  Robins  and  West,  1977;  Follain  and  Malpezzi,  1981; 
Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez, 1986; Goodman and Ittner, 1992; Kiel and Zabel, 
1999). The inclusion of price setting behaviour jointly with inaccuracy provides a 
direct  link  between  these  studies  (the  hedonic  approach)  and  those  studies  that 
investigate  the  price  setting  decision  of  homeowners,  which  is  usually  based  on 
list/transaction prices (e.g. Horowitz, 1992; Genesove and Mayer, 1997; Glower et al., 
1998; Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Anglin et al., 2003; Herrin et al., 2004). To give an 
explicit economic interpretation, we focus on the effect of mortgage commitment, 
which is measured by the loan payment relative to household income. In particular, 
Stein (1995) argues that homeowners with a high level of debt might be less likely to   2 
move house due to down-payment constraints. In addition, homeowners who do not 
move have a low opportunity cost of fishing, while successful fishing leads to an 
exogenous trade gain. This reasoning provides a possible explanation for the results in 
a seminal paper by Genesove and Mayer (1997). They demonstrate that homeowners 
in the Boston condominium market who face a down-payment constraint, captured by 
the  mortgage  loan-to-assessed  value,  have  a  higher  list  price  mark-up  over  the 
assessed value of the home due to higher reservation prices.
1 Our paper relates to this 
paper. In particular, we argue that a similar reasoning as given by Stein (1995) can be 
used to explain a causal relationship between the loan-to-income ratio and sale price 
expectations. However, the central question remains whether homeowners are price 
setters in the housing market, or just inaccurate with regard to the market price? We 
argue that homeowners who are less likely to move, due to a high loan-to-income 
ratio, are also less inclined to search. Consequently, they are less accurate.  
The estimates in this paper are based on a unique dataset of about 30 thousand 
homeowners, including potential movers and non-movers, from the Dutch Housing 
Demand Survey (WoON) of 2006 that is merged with both the officially assessed 
value of the house and official taxable income records. To control for unobserved 
individual and house characteristics, we include zip code fixed effects. We identify 
price setting behaviour by evaluating the own house price valuation as a mark-up 
against the officially assessed value of the house.
2 The unexplained variation in the 
own house price valuation is interpreted as inaccuracy. With regard to the institutional 
setting, the Netherlands lacks a statutory minimum down payment, in contrast to the 
US  and  various  other  European  countries.
3 Hence,  this  setup  allows  us  to  focus 
directly  on mortgage qualification based on income, without down payments as a 
confounding factor.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
institutional setting. Section 3 presents the underlying theory. Section 4 puts forward 
                                                 
1 Those households with a lower loan-to-value ratio also spent a longer time on the market. In general, 
the seller trades off the possibility of a higher selling price versus the costs associated with a longer 
time on the market (see Anglin et al., 2003; Genesove and Mayer, 1997; Glower, 1998; Horowitz, 
1992; Herrin et al., 2004).  
2 The assessed value as a benchmark is not uncommon in the price index literature (see Clapp and 
Giacotto, 1998, in relation to the hedonic method; Bourassa et al., 2006 for the SPAR index).  
3 Nevertheless, the outstanding mortgage amount in a country without a statutory minimum down 
payment can be interpreted as an informal constraint imposed by banks (in relation to homeownership 
rates, see Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003).    3 
the methodology and empirical model. Section 5 discusses the data. Section 6 shows 
the main results while section 7 discusses the conclusions.  
2. Institutional Setting: Assessed Values and Mortgages  
As  of  1995,  Dutch  law  stipulates  that  each  of  the  municipalities  in  the 
Netherlands  is  required  to  make  an  estimate  of  the  market  value  of  all  of  its 
buildings.
4 This  results  in  an  officially  assessed  value,  which  is  denoted  by  the 
acronym  WOZ.  The  assessments  were  performed  on  a  semi-regular  basis  (1st  of 
January in 1995, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2008). The assessed value is mainly 
used for tax purposes in the years following the date of valuation.
5 The municipality 
(assessor)  bases  the  assessed  value  on  the  recent  sale  price  of  the  house.
6 
7 The 
assessed value is not based on the outstanding mortgage of a household. If the sale 
price  is  not  available,  the  house  will  be  compared  with  houses  in  the  direct 
neighbourhood.  A  special  government  body  is  required  to  monitor,  inspect,  and 
approve the final assessed values.
8 This paper utilizes the officially assessed value of 
residential property at the 1
st of January 2003. This was the relevant reference value 
for taxation in the years 2005 and 2006. By law (article 24 of the WOZ law), the 
municipalities  were  required  to  send  a  notice  with  the  assessed  value  to  the 
homeowner  before  the  28
th  of  February  2005,  which  ensures  that  this  value  was 
available to the subjects in the early 2006 survey on which our analysis is based.
9 
10 
Homeowners were allowed to object to the assessed value. However, they had to do 
so within six weeks of the 28
th of February 2005, which limited the time available to 
                                                 
4 The law is denoted by the name “Wet WOZ” (1994). 
5 Property tax (OZB) by municipalities, Income tax (Eigen Woning Forfait) and tax for water quantity 
management. Valuation has occurred annually (used for taxation in the following year) since 2007. 
6 By law (Kadasterwet), the sales prices and some general house characteristics are also recorded by a 
separate organization (the Kadaster).  
7 Based on sale records, the municipality (assessor) tries to give an expected value for the house. If the 
sale price deviates substantially from this expectation, the reason for such a deviation is investigated 
(e.g. rebuilds). 
8 This government body is “de Waarderingskamer”. 
9 As of 2005 (date of valuation 2003), the notice was combined with the (municipal) property taxation 
form.  
10 According to article 24 (Wet WOZ), the assessed value after 2003 (i.e. date of valuation 2005) had to 
be revealed eight weeks after the 1
st of January 2007. Hence, this value was still unknown to the 
respondents in the 2006 survey.     4 
file an objection.
11 Moreover, objections with regard to (lowering) the assessed value 
were only considered if the decrease in value was above a certain threshold.
12  
  Dutch homeowners are not required to make a down-payment for the purchase 
of a home. Mortgage qualification is mainly based on the amount of income that a 
household generates.
13 Most lenders provide mortgages of up to 125 percent of the 
execution value (85-90 percent of the sale value) of the home and, as a rule of thumb, 
a monthly loan payment one third of the monthly gross income is allowed.
14 It is 
permitted  to  finance  transaction  costs,  such  as  transfer  taxation,  directly  with  the 
mortgage.  Mortgage  rents  are  tax  deductable.
15 
16 As  a  consequence,  this  paper 
utilizes  the  official  taxable  income  records  of  2005  (taxable  household  income), 
which  adjust  for  those  taxes.
17 There  are  several  mortgage  types  available  for 
households to finance a home. Mortgage life insurance consists of a loan and a life 
insurance part. No pay-off is made, but interest and a savings premium are paid. The 
accumulated savings are used to repay the mortgage. This is called an endowment 
mortgage. The escrow mortgage is similar. However, the premium includes a risk 
premium  to  repay  the  mortgage  in  the  event  of  death.  Investment  mortgages  are 
similar  to  escrow  mortgages  in  the  sense  that  the  loan  is  repaid  with  a  deposit. 
However, the deposit is based on investments. In essence, this mortgage is a special 
form of the no pay-off mortgage. With the no pay-off mortgage, interest is paid during 
the duration of the mortgage only. At maturity, the principal balance of the loan has to 
be  repaid  (e.g.  by  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  home).  A  level  payment 
                                                 
11 There is no fixed date at which a municipality has to decide whether the objection is regarded as 
legitimate. The assessed values corrected for the objections were not included in the data we utilized. 
12 For instance, a minimum of five percent if the house is below 200,000 euros and a minimum of four 
percent (10,000 euros) if the house is between 200,000 euros and 500,000 euros. Most houses in the 
Netherlands are within these ranges. 
13 Utilizing own capital to buy a house or a highly valued house (assessed value) may result in more 
favourable borrowing conditions.  
14 Credit is relatively unrestricted in comparison to other countries (see Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003). This 
can lead to substantial leverage. Since the 1
st of January 2007, mortgage lenders have had to base the 
maximum loan on the conditions used in the national insurance scheme (e.g. maximum of 42.4% of 
income in 2008 based on 6 percent interest as reference).  
15 As of the 1
st of January 2004, mortgage rents are only fully tax deductible if the excess housing value 
after the sale of the house is used for the purchase of the new home. This creates an institutional link 
between sale prices and mortgages. 
16 As of the 1
st of January 1995, borrowers can access lower mortgage interest rates by using the 
national insurance scheme against default, which results in lower default risk premiums on mortgages. 
17 From 1993 onward, the income of the spouse may also be included in the mortgage attainment 
procedure. This possibly created an exogenous shock in the loan-to-income ratios for married couples. 
The increase in finance possibilities of households with double earners was stated in “de 
tweeverdienersregeling”.  
   5 
(amortization) mortgage has a mortgage loan payment that consists of interest and 
capital repayment. This amount remains fixed for a particular chosen period. In this 
paper, we have no information about this fixed interest rate period. At the beginning 
of  the  repayment  scheme,  the  payment  largely  consists  of  interest.  With  a  linear 
mortgage, a fixed payment is made each month. The interest paid decreases over the 
years such that the loan payment is relatively low at maturity. With a stocks mortgage, 
households borrow more than the purchase price of the home. This excess loan is 
invested  in  stocks  and  bonds.  A  combination  of  these  mortgages  or  multiple 
mortgages (for instance, to finance a second home) is possible. There are some other 
mortgage  types  such  as mortgages  that  offer  the  possibility to  withdraw  (part  of) 
previous payments. Sub-prime mortgages are very rare in the Netherlands.    
3. Theory: Mortgages and Sale Price Expectations 
This section first relates sale price expectations to a particular type of price 
setting behaviour of the homeowner. Alternatively, the role of inaccuracy is discussed.  
Our motivation for identifying fishing as a particular type of price setting is 
based on Stein (1995). He shows that there are three groups of homeowners, based on 
the mortgage value: unconstrained movers, constrained movers, and non-movers.
18 
Subsequently,  he  discusses  the  possibility  that  homeowners  can  either  fish  for  an 
above  market  price  or  that  they  can  achieve  the  market  price  with  certainty.  In 
particular, non-movers have no opportunity cost of fishing, while successful fishing 
might  allow  such  homeowners  to  move.  However,  movers  face  the  possibility  of 
losing the opportunity to move (and the associated exogenous trade gains). Hence, 
Stein concludes that “there should be more fishing … in the non-mover range” (Stein, 
1995, p. 400). This paper investigates this claim in relation to the loan-to-income ratio. 
The effect of the loan-to-income ratio is similar to the down-payment case.  
In particular, Stein (1995) discusses a three-period model. At period one, a 
homeowner has one unit of housing stock including debt K denoted in the numeraire 
good food. In period two, households can buy a home of size H. In period three, 
labour income earned is1 K + . Homeowners repay their mortgage. Hence, they have a 
net income of 1 K K P + − + , one unit of food and one unit of housing. Subsequently, 
homeowners achieve utility  ln( ) (1 )ln( ) U H F M α α θ = + − + , where H is the housing 
good,  F  is  food  and θ  are  exogenous  trade  gains  if  a  homeowner  moves  (M=1). 
                                                 
18 We do not distinguish between a homeowner or household as a unit of analysis. This avoids the 
discussion of intra-household allocation and decision making.    6 
Homeowners  are  ambivalent  about  moving  if 
ln( ) (1 )ln(1 ) 0 U H P PH α α θ = + − + − + = . Stein argues that the homeowner has a 
down-payment  constraint ( )/ PH P K γ ≤ − ,  where  γ  is  the  down-payment 
requirement. Substituting the maximum amount of H that a homeowner can buy in the 
utility function leads to an implicit function, which defines the threshold level of debt 
K*    for  which  a  homeowner  is  indifferent  between  moving  or  not  moving.  The 
difference  in  our  analysis  is  that  the  down-payment  constraint  is  replaced  by  a 
mortgage qualification constraint based on income. In particular, households face a 
loan-to-income  ratio  of 
rK
I
,  where  r  is  the  loan-payment-to-mortgage  multiplier 
(interest rate) and I is the exogenous income in period one. Hence, rK  is the interest 




−   is the loan-to-income available to spend on housing H. However, 
this is a constant ratio which, in itself, says nothing about the level of H a household 
consumes.  Multiplying  by  income  I  gives  again  the  loan  households  pay  on  the 
remaining borrowing capacity. This loan payment is assumed to be associated with a 
level of debt through (dividing by) the loan payment to mortgage multiplierr . This 





= − = −               (1) 
Equation (1) can again be used in the utility function to implicitly define the 
level of debt at which households are indifferent about moving. Hence, it is only the 
formula that restricts housing demand that is different from Stein (1995). Households 
with higher levels of debt (a higher loan-to-income ratio) are more likely to exceed 
the threshold level of debt and, consequently, they are less likely to move. In essence, 
a high mortgage commitment diminishes the amount left for households to borrow in 
the future (i.e. they can spend less on future housing), which limits their ability to 
move.
19  
  With regard to fishing behaviour, Stein (1995) argues that a homeowner who 
does not want to move (M=0) incurs no opportunity cost of fishing (Opp=0). The 
decision not to move is characterized by a reservation price  r p  that is higher than the 
                                                 
19 A main limitation of this model is that it is static. The intertemporal choice between current and 
future housing is not incorporated.   7 
market price  m p . If the homeowner decides to fish for an above market price (i.e. a 
mark-up), he might get lucky with chance q, such that he can sell his house for the 
reservation price. Subsequently, he can reap the benefits from trade θ . In addition, 
with  chance  z  the  homeowner  sells  his  house  above  the  reservation  price.  This 
additional  price  gain  leads  to  the  benefit  B.  Hence,  with  a  chance  q z + the 
homeowner receives a sale price above the reservation price. With a chance 1 q z − −  
he incurs the opportunity cost of fishing. The expected value of fishing isq zB θ + . 
Consequently, this homeowner will always expect a positive value of fishing, if q, z, 
the trade gain θ , and the additional benefit B  are positive. We compare this outcome 
with a homeowner who decides to move. The reservation price of this homeowner is 
below the market price. If this homeowner does not fish, he will obtain the trade gain 
with certainty. Hence, this is his opportunity cost of fishing. However, he might be 
able to obtain some extra money out of the sale of his home, which provides him with 
the utility equivalent gain θ  with chance q and additional benefit B with chance z. His 
expected  value  of  fishing  is (2 1) q z zB θ + − + .  Hence,  if  (2 1) q z zB θ + − >  and 
(2 1) 0 q z θ + − < (i.e.2 1 q z + < ) the homeowner does not decide to fish. In contrast, 
the homeowner who decides not to move always has an incentive to fish due to the 
low opportunity cost of fishing.  
To summarize, homeowners with a higher loan-to-income ratio are less likely 
to move. As a consequence, they are more inclined to fish, so that they will be able to 
move and reap the benefits of trade. Homeowners with a lower loan-to-income ratio 
are less inclined to fish for a higher price. They only search for a higher price to 
obtain additional benefits. If they fish for a higher price, they will face the possibility 
that they will have to deal with the opportunity cost of fishing. We expect to find that 
these incentives determine the sale price expectations of homeowners.
20 Note that the 
existence of such expectations (i.e. a mark-up) is not unreasonable, given imperfect 
arbitrage as a result of market imperfections. In particular, buyers face substantial 
search and transaction costs; houses are differentiated products; and the characteristics 
of  a  seller  are  private  information  relative  to  the  market.  All  of  these  market 
characteristics allow the homeowner to act as a price setter in the housing market. 
                                                 
20 A contradictory argument is that households in a better financial position are able to wait longer to 
obtain higher prices. Even though they are able to, they are less inclined to do so given the opportunity 
cost they incur.   8 
  The limitations of this theory are clear. Homeowners want a higher sale price 
for their home such that they can consume more and reap the benefits of trade. Hence, 
price setting behaviour is not the result of bargaining strength, and acute financial 
distress  is  ignored.  However,  the  explanation  of  Stein  (1995)  is  quite  general.  In 
particular, all factors that affect the decision to move have an effect on price setting 
behaviour.  As  mentioned,  this  paper  mainly  focuses  on  the  effect  of  the  loan-to-
income ratio. However, the role of, for instance, capital gains is discussed in one of 
the extensions. 
Next,  we  discuss  the  inaccuracy  of  the  homeowner,  which  is  a  second 
common  argument  used  to  explain  why  homeowners  deviate  from  market  prices. 
Assume that homeowners have some degree of knowledge π  about market prices pm, 
such  that  the  perceived  market  price  is m p π + .  If  homeowners  are  fully 
knowledgeable ( 0) π = ,  they  know  the  market  price.  However,  homeowners  have 
imperfect information about the market price (i.e. due to search costs or cognitive 
constraints). Assume that their knowledge depends on search effort s,  ( ) f s π = . If 
homeowners who are less likely to move (i.e. higher loan-to-income ratio) also search 
less for market price information, a positive relationship between inaccuracy and the 
loan-to-income ratio is to be expected.  
Of course, this simple argument could be extended by recognizing that the 
effectiveness  of  a  search  and  the  processing  of  knowledge  depend  on  search 
technology. For instance, highly educated people are more accurate due to the search 
technology they possess. In addition, the accuracy of homeowners might depend on 
price signals, for example, as a result of turnover in the market or the government 
provision of information about house value. These extensions are, although interesting, 
not the main point of investigation in this study.   
4. Methodology and the Empirical Model  
This  section  argues  that  hedonic  estimates  based  on  the  own  house  price 
valuation  are  biased.  Subsequently,  it  discusses  the  estimation  of  the  parameters 
associated with price setting behaviour and inaccuracy.   
We argue that the expected sale price consists of three additively separable 
components: 
( ) ( , ) ( , ) i f i p i i inf i i v p x p x h p x h = + +             (2)   9 
where vi is the own house price valuation for homeowner i, pf is the fundamental price 
of the home, pp is the part of the own house price valuation related to price setting 
behaviour, and pinf is the part of the own house price valuation due to inaccuracy. The 
price  setting  behaviour  and  the  inaccuracy  of  the  homeowner  both  capture  the 
individual-specific nature of the own house price valuation. Both  components are 
determined  by  xi,  which  is  a  vector  of  house  characteristics  (i.e.  location,  time, 
amount  and  quality  of  the  housing  consumption)  and  hi,  which  is  a  vector  of 
individual characteristics (or household characteristics). 
The fundamental price (pf) can be considered to be a constant value part of a 
house  that  is  dependent  on  the  housing  good  xi  and  that  is  independent  of  the 
individual characteristics. As a consequence, this part is called a house-specific effect. 
The  fundamental  price  ensures  that,  even  without  price  setting  behaviour  and 
inaccuracy, the house has a value. This value in such a case equals the aggregate 
market price (the standard hedonic case). However, it seems more likely that there is 
price setting behaviour and inaccuracy, given the theory we provided above. Hence, 
the fundamental price is not the aggregate market price, unless the individual effects 
cancel/aggregate out. In the classical hedonic approach (i.e. Rosen, 1974), individual 
characteristics play a role only insofar as they determine the marginal attribute prices. 
Hence, the house is usually the unit of analysis in the estimation of a hedonic model, 
instead of the individual.   
The own house price valuation (equation (2)) can be parameterized (ignoring 
interaction terms) as,  
' '
i i i i v x h β γ ε = + +                 (3) 
whereβ  is the parameter vector associated with the house characteristics,γ  captures 
the  effect  of  individual  characteristics  and  i ε  is  a  composite  error  term  including 
unobserved house heterogeneity,  i ϕ , and unobserved individual effects,  i η . 
The  main  conclusion  based  on  equation  (3)  is  that  omitting  individual 
characteristics  (e.g.  the  loan-to-income  ratio)  leads  to  a  bias  of  the  hedonic 
coefficients if sale price expectations are determined by individual characteristics (i.e. 
see  theory),  and  individual  and  house  characteristics  are  correlated.
21  Such  a 
correlation is not unreasonable if there is sorting of individuals in the housing market. 
                                                 
21 To be precise, this leads to inconsistent estimates. The violation of the zero conditional mean 
assumption leads to bias. In the main text, both terms are used interchangeably.    10 
To give an indication of the size of the bias, we will show a hedonic estimate and an 
augmented  hedonic  model  (equation  (3))  in  the  empirical  part.  Unobserved  local 
amenities ( i ϕ ) and socio-economic status ( i η ) will be captured by zip code fixed 
effects. In addition, we will provide evidence of sorting. 
  The  usual  argument  for  biased  hedonic  estimates  is  that  a  deviation  from 
market prices is house specific. In particular, pm is the real variable of interest in 
equation  (3),  but  only  vi  is  observed  (i.e. *
i i m v p χ = − ).
22 However,  support  for  a 
systematic  deviation  is  mixed.  Ihlanfeldt  and  Martinez-Vazquez  (1986)  find  such 
evidence  in  relation  to  house  characteristics  (also  separately  for  individual 
characteristics). Goodman and Ittner (1992) and Kiel and Zabel (1999) do not find 
such  evidence  (conditional  upon  individual  characteristics).
23 Nevertheless,  in  this 
setup the relationship between the individual characteristics and the bias in standard 
hedonic  estimates  remains  vague.  More  importantly,  the  economic  role  of  the 
individual  characteristics  in  such  hedonic  estimates  is  unclear.  Ihlanfeldt  and 
Martinez-Vazquez (1986) include individual characteristics in the hedonic model to 
proxy  for  unobserved  house  characteristics.  In  contrast,  we  argue  that  individual 
characteristics might simply be a measure of individual behaviour.  
  In this paper, the individual characteristics are related to the inaccuracy of the 
homeowner  and  price  setting  behaviour.  In  particular,  the  effect  of  individual 
characteristics (i.e.γ ) can be interpreted from a price setting behaviour ( 2 γ ) and an 
inaccuracy ( 3 γ ) perspective (i.e.  1 2 3 γ γ γ γ = + + , where  1 0 γ = , since the fundamental 
price is not directly affected by individual characteristics). The same applies to the 
parameters on the house characteristics ( 1 2 3 β β β β = + + ). Hence, the estimation of 
equation  (3)  leads  to  an  identification  problem  if  interest  lies  in  the  individual 
parameter estimates. In this paper, interest lies in the parameters ( 2 γ  and  3 γ ) on the 
loan-to-income ratio. Consequently, we need additional information to identify these 
parameters.
24 
                                                 
22 We argue that the sale price expectation is the main variable of interest, not the unobserved market 
price. Consequently, it is inappropriate to interpret a deviation from the market price as a measurement 
error.  
23 Although this may be a result of the low sample size they utilize. Kiel and Zabel (1999) do find that 
the length of residence has an effect.  
24 Alternatively, if theory predicts an opposite effect of  2 γ  versus  3 γ , it is at least possible to make a 
statement regarding which effect dominates based on the total effect. If an individual characteristic   11 
  We estimate the price setting behaviour parameters by the evaluation of the 




2 2 ( , )   p i i i i i i i i p x h markup v a x h u β γ = = − = + +         (4) 
where ai  is the assessed value of the home and ui is an error term. The mark-up is 
supposed to capture the price setting behaviour part (i.e. 2 β  and  2 γ ). In particular, we 
assume  that  the  (officially)  assessed  price  of  the  house  is  known  ex  ante  to  the 
homeowner and is used as a reference value.
25 This ensures that variation in the mark-
up is not due to inaccuracy.
26 In contrast to the assessed value, the (hedonic) predicted 
price (Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez, 1986) or subsequent sale price (Goodman 
and  Ittner,  1992)  are  commonly  not  a  priori  known  to  the  household.
27 By  the 
comparison of the merged officially assessed values to the assessed value available in 
the survey, this paper is at least able to give some indicative evidence whether the 
benchmark is known.
28 
  After substitution of the mark-up from equation (4) into equation (2), some 
rewriting and parameterization of the remaining fundamental price component term 
and inaccuracy term, we get 
 
' '
1, 3 3   i i i i a x h β γ µ = + +                (5) 
where i µ  is an error term (i.e. i i u ε − ). Hence, an auxiliary regression based on the 
assessed  value  will  capture  the  fundamental  price  and  inaccuracy  component.  In 
                                                                                                                                            
uniquely affects price setting behaviour or inaccuracy (i.e. 2 0 γ =  or  3 0 γ = ), there would be no 
identification problem. However, based on the previous theoretical arguments, both possibilities are, in 
relation to the loan-to-income ratio, not true.  
25 In particular, the reference value assumption ensures that the assessed value is the (only) relevant 
benchmark that homeowners use in their expectations. As a consequence, other explanations are 
excluded. For instance, Dusanski and Koç (2007) base price expectation on previous prices and show 
that this can result in an upward sloping demand curve. 
26 If the own house price valuation and the officially assessed value have a similar fundamental price 
component, which we implicitly assumed in equation (4), the effects of house characteristics associated 
with the fundamental price are differenced out. If price setting behaviour is independent of house 
characteristics a joint significance test on those characteristics could provide a test of the similarity of 
the fundamental price component between the assessed value and own house price valuation. We will 
show this significance test in the result section. In addition, if the assessed value (benchmark) 
incorporates price setting behaviour, price setting behaviour (the remaining individual/house 
characteristics) would difference out. This could explain the result by Goodman and Ittner (1992), Kiel 
and Zabel (1999). 
27 Although the previous sale price of the house used by Kiel and Zabel (1999) is more likely to satisfy 
this assumption. 
28 The use of the officially assessed value comes at a cost; it is less likely to be known than the survey 
assessed value. However, the survey assessed value is only available for a selection of homeowners.   12 
particular, the variation in the own house price valuation that is left unexplained by 
the mark-up or fundamental price is interpreted as inaccuracy (see equation (2)).
29 
A final benefit of our  approach is that the own house price valuation and 
assessed value are available for the entire market of potential sellers. Genesove and 
Mayer (1997) found the effect of the loan-to-value on the mark-up for a subsample of 
sellers only. However, the decision to sell (to move) may crucially be dependent on 
prices (the mark-up), which may result in sample selection bias (see Gatzlaff and 
Haurin, 1998; Goetzman and Peng, 2006). This is a problem which may affect most 
list/transaction  price  studies.  As  a  correction,  it  is  possible  to  use  the  standard 
Heckman approach.
30 We will show a decision to move regression, since it plays a 
role in the theory we provided, although we do not need it to correct for sample 
selection bias. 
The main critique against the proposed method is the use of the officially 
assessed value as a benchmark. In particular, this benchmark may (systematically) 
deviate from the actual benchmark used by homeowners due to several reasons.
31 
First,  the  assessed  value  might  be  a  conservative  market  price  estimate  by  the 
government, to avoid objections by homeowners. The only evidence we provide is 
that the officially assessed value does seem to act as a lower boundary on expectations. 
Second, the expected benchmark may also deviate from the assessed value due to tax 
evasion. As mentioned, this effect might be mitigated due to the time available to file 
for an official objection and the restrictions imposed on such objections. Third, there 
is a lag in the date of valuation (i.e. the beginning of 2003 versus the survey date at 
                                                 
29 Although this reasoning is used to obtain the parameter estimates associated with inaccuracy, it does 
not provide us with a direct measure of inaccuracy.  The main difficulty is that all components in 
equation (2) are possibly related. As a result we do not have, for instance, a direct measure of the 
fundamental  price  in  the  own  house  price  valuation  model.  If  inaccuracy  is  independent  of  house 
characteristics, we could use house characteristics to capture the fundamental price and the mark-up (or 
individual characteristics that are assumed to uniquely affect price setting behaviour) to capture price 
setting  behaviour.  In  addition,  if  inaccuracy  and  price  setting  behaviour/fundamental  price  are  not 
related, the resulting parameter estimates would be consistent. Consequently, the unexplained variation 
in the own house price valuation could provide a direct measure of inaccuracy. However, it is very 
likely that inaccuracy and price setting behaviour/fundamental price are correlated, since they are based 
on similar determinants.  
30 However, in order to identify (not only through the non-linear functional form) the effect of sample 
selection, additional variables in the selection equation are required. Usually ad hoc measures are used, 
with the exclusion restriction imposed that such measures do not affect the sale price. For instance, 
Gatzlaff and Haurin (1998) use a widow indicator variable and Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez 
(1986) use family size, number of workers, recent birth of a child, the presence of school aged-children, 
crowding and excess space indicators. 
31 If the assessed value deviates from the homeowner’s benchmark independently of individual and 
house characteristics, the estimates remain unchanged. Furthermore, note that the benchmark used by 
homeowners does not necessarily have to equal the market price.    13 
the  end  of  2005).  The  assessed  value  was  at  least  revealed  to  the  homeowners 
(February 2005) relatively close to the survey date. Even if the assessed value is 
adjusted by inflation factors per municipality, only the zip code fixed effects would 
change.
32 Nevertheless, in one of the extensions an individual-specific measure of 
capital gains is included as an additional conditioning variable. Fourth, the officially 
assessed value may exhibit coding and measurement error. This is usually not deemed 
a problem if the measurement error is in the dependent variable.  
A final critique against the use of the mark-up is that its level may depend on 
market  conditions  at  a  particular  point  in  time  (e.g.  a  sellers  market).  Without 
information on the mark-up at different points in time, we cannot investigate this issue. 
In particular, we are not interested in the level of the mark-up, but on the structure 
within the mark-up.  
To summarize, we will show a hedonic regression based on the own house 
price valuation, a hedonic regression augmented with individual characteristics, an 
auxiliary regression based on the officially assessed value, the percentage mark-up 
regression  and  a  residential  mobility  regression.  All  models  were  estimated  with 
OLS.
33  
 5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We have used the Dutch Housing Demand Survey of 2006 (WoON 2006), 
provided  by  the  Netherlands  Ministry  of  Housing,  Spatial  Planning  and  the 
Environment (VROM). The resulting dataset contains 64,005 respondents (a response 
rate of 60 percent) questioned over eight months, from August 2005-March 2006 
(pooled cross sections).
34 Of the 64,005 respondents, 21,547 singles or head/partners 
reported the mark-up (survey assessed value and own house price valuation). The 
number  of  observations  is  severely  constrained,  since  only  71.7  percent  of  the 
approximately 30,000 homeowners reported the assessed value. In comparison, the 
monthly mortgage loan payment had a response of 86.3 percent (10.6 percent did not 
know, 3.1 percent refused) and the own house price valuation had a response of 87.7 
                                                 
32 However, diverging inflation paths per house type per zip code would not be captured. 
33 Note that some of the equations (e.g. the own valuation and assessed value model), could also be 
estimated jointly by SUR, but the benefits are, in our opinion, marginal. In particular, SUR estimated 
by feasible GLS may give more efficient estimates if errors for a given individual are correlated across 
equations (they are usually still assumed to be independent across i). However, since exactly the same 
regressors are used across equations (or if the errors are uncorrelated across equations) this estimator 
collapses to simple System OLS. Moreover, System OLS is just equation-by-equation OLS if the errors 
are uncorrelated across equations. In this paper, it was decided to use standard OLS.      
34 Note that this includes the over sampling in some municipalities.   14 
percent.  As  a  consequence,  merged  data  (by  Statistics  Netherlands)  of  officially 
assessed values (date of valuation 2003) are used. In addition, the taxing authorities 
provided the relevant taxable income data to the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment.
35 After the merge of the officially assessed 
values and taxable incomes, the sample size is 30,294 observations.  
[-TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE-] 
The sample excludes outliers as follows. Houses with a year of build before 
1850 and a size larger than 450m2 are excluded. Moreover, houses attached to a farm 
or with a shop as part of the house are kept out of the analysis to ensure that the 
residential  value  of  the  home  is  not  mixed  with  business  value  (i.e.  the  largest 
selection).
36 The mark-up is constrained between -1 and 1 and a household with a loan 
payment more than 100 percent of income is excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, 
we exclude households with zero or negative income. In addition, a household size 
larger  than  10,  and  those  households  with  a  mortgage  which  have  a  remaining 
duration  of  more  than  40  years,  will  not  be  included  in  the  analysis.  After  this 
selection, 27,860 observations are left.
37 Due to missing values across the variables 
some additional observations are lost (27,786 remain). Finally, zip codes with only 
one observation are excluded, resulting in 27,262 final observations for estimation. 
Based on this sample, the descriptive statistics of the main dependent (house prices) 
and independent variables (financial position) are reported in Table 1. The descriptive 
statistics of the controls (other individual characteristics, house characteristics) are in 
Table 2. 
[-FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE-] 
5.1 Dependent variables: House prices and the mark-up 
Respondents were asked: “for how much do you think the house could be sold 
(without household effects)?”. Their average response, the own house price valuation, 
amounted to 283,245 euros. In comparison, average transaction prices, based on the 
median price per house type weighted by sales, were 228,500 euros in the last quarter 
of 2005 (as reported by the Dutch Association of Realtors). The officially assessed 
                                                 
35 73 percent of the income records were based on the year 2005, 27 percent were based on 2004 values 
and were raised with the contractual loan increases of 2005.  
36 A special type of house denoted by living unit (in Dutch “wooneenheid”) was also excluded. 
37 Note that the effect of the loan-to–income ratio on the percentage mark-up is already significant and 
of the expected sign if only zero and negative income is excluded.   15 
value is substantially lower, 236,707 euros.
38 Hence, this resulted in an absolute mark-
up  of  the  own  valuation  against  the  officially  assessed  value  of  46,539  euros,  or 
around 17 percent. In particular, the mark-up is predominantly positive with some 
weak truncation at zero, which is in accordance with the argument of nominal loss 
aversion (see Genesove and Mayer, 2001) and suggests that the officially assessed 
value indeed acts as a reference value in terms of a lower boundary on sale price 
expectations (see kernel density estimates, Figure 1).
39  
[-FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE-] 
  Does the provision of price information by governments spill through in the 
knowledge of homeowners? In particular, we assumed that homeowners know the 
officially assessed value. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the survey 
assessed value is on average only 162 euros higher than the officially assessed value. 
The kernel density of the difference in the survey and official value is plotted in 
Figure 2. There is a substantial peak in the density around 0. This is an indication that 
most homeowners know the officially assessed value, although there are substantial 
outliers.
40  
5.2 Main independent variables: Financial position 
The main independent variable is the monthly mortgage payment (interest, 
premium, capital repayment) in euros compared to the monthly taxable household 
income in euros. Homeowners with multiple mortgages (13.1 percent) reported the 
total mortgage amount and the total loan payment. The taxable household income is a 
measure which includes the tax benefits related to mortgage payments (mortgage rent 
deductibility). The mortgage loan payments constituted around 15.5 percent of taxable 
household income, based on an average monthly taxable household income of 3,963 
euros and an average mortgage loan of 122,671 euros.  
[-FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE-] 
                                                 
38 The average officially assessed value is larger than the average transaction price in 2005, which 
suggests that the houses sampled in the survey may be biased towards higher valued houses. However, 
for the regression estimates, sample selection based on the independent variables is usually not seen as 
a problem. 
39 There is an unexpected peak in the mark-up at 0.4, which does not affect the main regression results. 
40 Unreported regression results based on the (absolute log) difference between the survey and the 
official assessed value as a dependent variable suggest that there is also not much evidence of a 
systematic deviation (F-value house characteristics of  3.11, F- value individual characteristics of 5.25). 
There is meagre evidence that homeowners with a higher loan-to-income ratio are also less accurate 
(coefficient of 0.02, s.e. of 0.011). These results are indicative only, since they are based on the 
restricted survey sample of respondents who reported the assessed value. 
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Figure 3 displays the kernel density estimates of the loan-to-income ratio.  
The distribution is skewed to the right. The peak around zero is due to households 
with  no  outstanding  mortgage  (13.2  percent  of  the  sample).  This  distribution 
resembles  the  distribution  of  the  mortgage  loan-to-assessed  value  reported  by 
Genesove and Mayer (1997). The loan-to-value is not used in this study, since it is 
meant to capture down-payment constraints and the Netherlands does not have such 
constraints. Moreover, the use of the loan-to-income ratio has an additional benefit, 
since it avoids the same denominator in the mark-up and the independent variable of 
interest  (i.e.,  as  in  Genesove  and  Mayer,  1997).  The  average  loan-to-value  is  58 
percent.  
Finally, in extension to Genesove and Mayer (1997), ten mortgage types (the 
largest part of the sample, 27 percent, has a no-payoff mortgage) and the remaining 
mortgage duration (15 years on average) are used in the analysis.
41 Both measures 
pick up the unobserved heterogeneity in the loan-to-income ratio, for instance due to 
differences in payment schemes. In addition, the type of mortgage may cover for 
differences in risk attitudes.  
5.3 Further controls: Other individual characteristics and house characteristics 
The substantial amount of control variables is a clear benefit of the dataset. As 
mentioned,  statistics  about  further  controls  are  contained  in  Table  2.  Further 
individual  characteristics  that  act  as  controls  include:  youngest  child  between  0-5 
(dummy), no child (dummy), respondent obtained a university/hbo degree (dummy), 
gender (dummy), household size, household type (eight types), age and age squared. 
The housing good is defined by categorical dummies of size in square meters (seven 
categories), dummies for different classes of houses (six classes), a dummy whether a 
garden is present, a distance to centre dummy (five categories) and a dummy whether 
technical maintenance was performed in the last half year. Finally, zip code fixed 
effects (2,608 zip codes) and month of questioning dummies (eight months) were 
added.  
The sample averages of the control variables are as follows: 55 percent of the 
homeowners have no children; 35 percent completed higher education; 52 percent are 
females; average household size is 2.7 persons; 37 percent have a partner without 
children, and 41 percent have a partner with children; the average age is 49 years. 
                                                 
41 These control variables are based on the mortgage for which homeowners had to pay the most.    17 
With respect to house characteristics, average size is about 144 m2, 20 percent of the 
houses were built before 1945; 20 percent are terraced houses (32 percent); 41 percent 
of the houses are located within 15 minutes from the centre of the place of residence; 
85 percent have a garden; 23 percent of the respondents did technical maintenance 
within the last half year.  
[-FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE-]       
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Non-parametric regression  
Figure 4 estimates the relationship between the percentage mark-up and the 
loan-to-income ratio non-parametrically (kernel regression). There is a clear positive 
relationship between the two variables. Households with a low loan-to-income ratio 
also  expect  a  mark-up,  but  smaller  than  those  households  with  a  higher  loan-to-
income ratio. Hence, we do not find threshold effects, as in Genesove and Mayer 
(1997).  
[-TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-] 
6.2 Multivariate regression  
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.
42 Column 1 shows a standard 
hedonic regression based on the own house price valuation. Since a log-level model is 
estimated and a substantial amount of dummy variables are included, it is important to 
note that the coefficients should be interpreted according toexp( ) 1 x β∆ − . For instance, 
apartments are 50 percent cheaper (coefficient -0.699) relative to detached homes, 
ceteris paribus. Moreover, an increase in the size (m2) of the home increases the 
perceived hedonic value of the home, but at a decreasing marginal rate. The largest 
homes (>300 m2) were around 48% more expensive than the smallest category of 
houses  (<50  m2).  Note  that  most  of  the  house  characteristics  are  highly  jointly 
significant (F-value of 546). In addition, the Hausman specification test suggests that 
it  is  important  to  include  the  zip  code  fixed  effects.  The  linear  fit  is  large  for  a 
standard micro regression (48 percent of the variation in the log of the own valuation 
is explained by the independent variables).  
[-TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-] 
  Column 2 adds individual characteristics such as the loan-to-income ratio, to 
the hedonic regression. The inclusion of the significant individual characteristics (F-
                                                 
42 Appendix 1 discusses the role of the mark-up (the estimates) in the Dutch housing market.    18 
value equals 57) seems to affect the hedonic estimates substantially. For instance, the 
largest category of homes is only 42 percent higher in value relative to the smallest 
category  of  homes  (in  comparison  to  48  percent  earlier  on).  Hence,  the  standard 
hedonic estimates seem to be biased by the exclusion of the individual characteristics. 
These results shed doubt on the use of the own house price valuation in standard 
hedonic regressions. However, this outcome can be explained if particular types of 
individuals live in particular types of houses, for instance, through sorting. Table 4 
shows evidence of sorting. It reports the frequency distribution of household types 
across  size  categories  of  homes.  For  instance,  partners  with  children  seem  to 
predominately live in houses of sizes between 100m2 and 150m2. Singles mostly live 
in smaller homes (i.e. 50m2 to a 100m2). Finally, an increase of 1 percentage point in 
the  loan-to-income  ratio  increases  the  own  house  price  valuation  by  17  percent, 
ceteris  paribus.  This  is  quite  a  large  effect  and  may  reflect  the  substantial 
heterogeneity in sale price expectations. 
Column 3 reports an auxiliary regression based on the officially assessed value 
as  a  dependent  variable.  Most  individual  characteristics  (F-value  54)  and  house 
characteristics (F-value 454) are statistically significant.  
Column 4 reports the results based on the percentage mark-up.
43 In particular, 
the parameters are exactly the difference between the parameters of the own house 
price  valuation  regression  (column  2)  and  the  officially  assessed  value  regression 
(column  3).  There  is  a  substantial  decline  in  the  significance  of  the  house 
characteristics (F-value of 10 in contrast to the previous F-value of 445 in the own 
house price valuation regression). This result suggests that a substantial amount of 
house heterogeneity is differenced out, which is in accordance with the results in 
Goodman  and  Ittner  (1992)  and  Kiel  and  Zabel  (1999).  However,  the  house 
characteristics  are  still  significant,  which  indicates  that  there  is  not  an  exact 
fundamental price component in the own house price valuation and the assessed value. 
For instance, the mark-up is highest for the largest size category of homes and in the 
centre of a city.
44 The mark-up regression shows that most individual characteristics 
are no longer significant (F-value of 6.5). However, mortgage commitment still seems 
                                                 
43 The use of the log squeezes the (mainly positive) range of the mark-up. Hence, the coefficient on the 
loan-to-income ratio in a regression based on the actual percentage mark-up is somewhat higher. 
44 Nevertheless, the assumption that house characteristics are differenced out does not lead to a 
substantially different loan-to-income coefficient (i.e. 0.080, s.e. 0.012)). This provides some evidence 
in favour of the method used by Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez (1986), to only include individual 
characteristics in a mark-up regression.   19 
to matter. Column 4 shows that, of the 17 percent effect on sale price expectations, 
after  a  percentage  point  increase  in  the  loan-to-income  ratio,  7  percent  is  due  to 
pricing setting behaviour, ceteris paribus.
45 As mentioned before, this result can be 
explained by expectations about “fishing”. The remaining effect of 10 percent stays 
unexplained (i.e. the coefficients in the assessed value regression, column 3). This 
unexplained part can be interpreted as inaccuracy.
46 Hence, with respect to the loan-
to-income ratio, the results indicate that homeowners with a higher loan-to-income 
ratio are also less accurate. As mentioned, this result can be explained by a decrease 
in the mobility of those households, if a lower mobility implies a decrease in search. 
One of the main critiques against the mark-up is the omitted effect of previous 
price changes (i.e. capital gains). This is, in particular, relevant for the mark-up used 
in this paper, since the assessed value has a valuation date of 2003. As a consequence, 
column 5 shows the results with a measure of capital gains included in the mark-up 
regression. Capital gains until 2003 are assumed to be included in the assessed value. 
Capital  gains  from  2003  until  the  date  a  particular  individual  is  surveyed  are 
calculated based on price data from the Dutch Association of Realtors. They weight 
per house type the median house price by turnover. This results in a weighted average 
house price for 76 regions in the Netherlands. On average, this resulted in capital 
gains of 25,382 euros per individual (see Table 1). The capital gains are scaled by the 
original buy price of the home. This ensures that the measure of capital gains is 
individual  specific  (i.e.  not  perfectly  collinear  with  the  zip  code  fixed  effects).  If 
homeowners know about the size of the capital gains (even if they bought the house at 
a later date than 2003), and capital gains are the predominant factor in the mark-up, it 
is expected that capital gains is positively related to the mark-up. In contrast, the 
fishing  hypothesis  suggests  that  households  with  relatively  high  capital  gains  are 
especially less inclined to have a high mark-up. Column 5 shows that results are in 
favour of the fishing hypothesis. An increase in the percentage capital gains has a 
                                                 
45 The mark-up model can be considered as a transformed model to identify price setting behaviour in 
the original model (i.e. equation (3)). Hence, the interpretation of the estimated parameters should be in 
the setup of the original model. In contrast, the mark-up equation might be viewed as being of interest 
on its own. A percentage point increase in the loan-to-income ratio increases the mark-up by 0.07 
percent, around 3,258 euros.  
46 However, for education this interpretation leads to a strange result. A higher education may be 
associated with more inaccuracy. This suggests that the unexplained part in the own house price 
valuation might capture other forces than inaccuracy alone. Education has an effect that goes beyond 
the price setting behaviour captured by the mark-up.     20 
negative effect on the mark-up.
47 More importantly, the effect of the loan-to-income 
ratio remains virtually unchanged.  
Finally,  column  6  shows  that,  as  predicted  by  the  inaccuracy  and  fishing 
hypothesis,  a  higher  loan-to-income  ratio  is  associated  with  a  decrease  in  the 
likelihood to move. A Linear Probability Model is estimated to keep the method and 
model as close as possible to the previous regressions. The predicted values range 
between -0.076 and 0.560 with an average predicted mobility of 0.176 and a standard 
error of the predicted value of 0.076. This suggests that the predicted values stay 
predominately in the [0,1] range. For instance, a standard deviation increase in the 
loan-to-income  ratio  decreases  the  preference  to  move  within  two  years  by  1.3 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. This is not a large effect relative to, for instance, 
some demographic variables.    
6.3 Robustness checks 
This  sub-section  discusses  various  robustness  checks  of  the  mark-up 
regression  (Table  3,  column  4).  We  report  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  A 
subsample  of  homeowners  who  want  to  move  (4,787  observations)  results  in  a 
statistically insignificant coefficient on the loan-to-income ratio of 0.0312 (0.027), 
whereas  those  who  did  not  want  to  move  had  a  significant  coefficient  of  0.0689 
(0.013). This is in accordance with the proposition as stated by Stein (1995). 
  In addition, three different measures of income and one different measure of 
loan payment were used. The monthly mortgage payment included interest, premium 
and capital repayment. The loan-to-income ratio, based on interest only, results in a 
coefficient  of  0.068  (0.013).  The  loan-to-income  ratio  effect,  based  on  gross 
household  income,  was  0.098  (0.016).  The  definition  used  by  the  Netherlands 
Ministry  of  Housing,  Spatial  Planning  and  the  Environment  (VROM)  gave  a 
coefficient of 0.076 (0.012). Based on the definition used by Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS), the coefficient was 0.107 (0.012). It seems that the coefficients are relatively 
stable, even with the use of different income or loan payment measures. Both income 
definitions of VROM and CBS are disposable household income. The main difference 
is the treatment of housing. The VROM-definition, for instance, excludes government 
                                                 
47 Actual percentage capital gains (i.e. based on the own house price valuation and the original buy 
price) had a small positive effect on the mark-up of 0.002 and no significant effect on the decision to 
move. However, this measure has the same numerator as the mark-up. Hence, a positive relationship is 
to be expected. In addition, the capital gains are not necessarily as of 2003. In the end, the price index 
capital gains may well differ from capital gains used in the decision of homeowners (i.e. measurement 
error). In such a case, the effects as reported in this paper may well be understated (attenuation bias).    21 
subsidies to homeowners. A detailed description of the different income measures is 
available  in  the  research  documentation  of  the  Netherlands  Ministry  of  Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment. 
  The mark-up results are based on the officially assessed value of the home. 
Based on the survey-assessed value (19,813 observations), the estimated coefficient 
on the loan-to- income ratio was 0.040 (0.020), which suggests that the non-response 
in the survey value seems to lead to an underestimation of the loan-to-income effect.  
  The effect of the loan-to-income ratio in an absolute mark-up regression was 
24,366 euros (5,018 euros) (i.e. a percentage point increase in the loan-to-income ratio 
has an effect of 244 euros on the mark-up) against a total effect in the own house 
price valuation regression of 56,605 euros (7,211 euros). A correction in the level of 
the mark-up by the level of capital gains results in a loan-to-income effect of 24,176 
euros (5,026 euros), which is virtually the same as the uncorrected results.
48    
The inclusion of the loan-to-value ratio instead of the loan-to-income ratio in 
the mark-up regression results in a coefficient on the mark-up of 0.070 (0.006), which 
is close to the loan-to-income effect.  
Some  other  robustness  checks  were  also  done.  A  regression  for  the 
municipality with the largest amount of observations in our dataset (‘s-Gravenhage, 
820 observations) resulted in a loan-to-income ratio effect of 0.112 (0.055). Some 
municipalities  were  oversampled.  After  the  exclusion  of  oversampling  (17,600 
observations  are  left)  the  estimated  coefficient  was  0.0644  (0.014).  Excluding 
households  without  a  mortgage  (23,658  observations  are  left)  gave  a  significant 
coefficient  of  0.0746  (0.012).  Excluding  house  characteristics  and  zip  code  fixed 
effects resulted in a loan-to-income coefficient of 0.068 (0.011). A standard bivariate 
regression of the mark-up on the loan-to-income ratio gave a coefficient of 0.063 
(0.009). In general, the parameter estimates seem quite robust. 
7. Conclusion 
If  we  believe  that  expectations  play  an  important  role  in  the  individual 
decision making process and the economy as a whole, it is of fundamental importance 
to  understand  such  expectations.  Our  conclusions  with  regard  to  sale  price 
expectations are twofold.  
                                                 
48 However, the coefficient on the loan-to-income ratio is not exactly the same. This result is due to the 
construction of the capital gains, which are calculated until the date the respondent was surveyed. This 
introduces some variation per individual. Consequently, not only the coefficients on the zip code fixed 
effects change, but also the coefficient on the loan-to-income ratio.   22 
First, we conclude that the use of the own house price valuation for hedonic 
purposes will lead to biased hedonic estimates when individual effects are omitted. 
For instance, in a hedonic setup augmented with individual characteristics, estimates 
indicated that the largest category of homes was 42 percent higher in value relative to 
the smallest category of homes. However, standard hedonic results showed an effect 
of 48 percent, the difference being 6 percentage points. This bias can be explained by 
the relationship between individual-specific effects and house-specific effects through 
sorting.  For  example,  households  with  children  live  in  larger  homes  than  singles. 
These results are important, since the hedonic approach is widely applied in empirical 
research. For instance, biased hedonic coefficients as a result of the use of the own 
house  price  valuation  as  dependent  variable  also  question  the  usefulness  of  such 
estimates to generate housing demand and, subsequently, estimate housing demand 
parameters  (e.g.  Ioannides  and  Zabel,  2003;  Dusansky  and  Koç,  2007).  The 
implication of these results is that a proper estimate of market value should be based 
on the augmented hedonic approach. In particular, the reason for including individual 
characteristics  in  a  hedonic  model  may  not  only  be  to  proxy  for  omitted 
house/neighbourhood characteristics (i.e. see Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez, 1986), 
but more fundamentally to condition on individual/household behaviour.  
Second,  the  individual  effect  should  be  directly  related  to  the  sale  price 
expectation  for  the  bias  to  occur.  Hence,  this  paper  contributes  by  providing  an 
economic rationale for such a relationship in terms of price setting behaviour and 
inaccuracy. Results indicate that homeowners with a higher loan-to-income ratio have 
higher sale price expectations. Around 40 percent of this effect is related to price 
setting behaviour. In particular, households with a higher loan-to-income ratio require 
a  higher  mark-up.  This  is  in  line  with  the  fishing  hypothesis  by  Stein  (1995). 
Households  with  a  higher  loan-to-income  ratio  are  less  likely  to  move  and,  in 
particular, non-movers do not incur the opportunity cost of fishing for a higher price. 
Households  appear  to  “fish”  before  the  sale  of  the  current  home.  According  to 
Genesove and Mayer (1997), households also seem to realize their perceived prices. 
Hence,  information  about  the  seller,  besides  what  is  sold,  might  prove  to  be  of 
considerable importance for buyers. Further results showed that homeowners with a 
higher loan-to-income ratio were also less accurate. We argue that households that are 
less mobile in the housing market are also less inclined to search for additional market 
price information. Around 60 percent of the loan-to-income effect is attributed to   23 
inaccuracy. Thus, homeowners are inaccurate, but they also act as price setters in the 
housing market.   24 
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Appendix 1: Abolishing the favourable fiscal treatment of homes 
This section provides additional insight with regard to the size of the mark-up 
and capital gains for the Dutch housing market. Subsequently, to show the relevance 
of the regression estimates from a policy point of view, the effects of abolishing the 
favourable fiscal treatment of owning a home are discussed. 
  The  total  sample  of  64,005  respondents  is  associated  with  7,127,469 
households  in  the  Netherlands.
49 The  sample  of  27,262  homeowners  amounts  to 
around 3,373,242 homeowners. As mentioned, average transaction prices were around 
228,500 euros in the last quarter of 2005, which results in a total housing portfolio of 
about 771 billion euros. The total mark-up is 160 billion euros. The accrued capital 
gains between 2003 and the end of 2005 are about 72 billion euros. Hence, the excess 
market return latent in the Dutch housing market of 2006 is 82 billion euros. A similar 
result  is  obtained  if  the  difference  in  mark-up  and  capital  gains  in  Table  1  are 
multiplied  by  the  number  of  total  homeowners.  The  excess  returns  homeowners 
expect from housing are quite substantial. In addition, these expectations might not be 
unreasonable, given the substantial house price increases in the Netherlands for the 
past decade and could be a driving force for subsequent price changes. Whether such 
expectations are realized remains an open question.  In particular, only 17.56% of 
homeowners  want  to  move  within  two  years.  Given  the  assumption  that  those 
homeowners  move,  14.4  billion  euros  of  the  82  billion  euros  mark-up  should  be 
realized  in  the  two  years  after  2006.  Of  course,  consumption  plans  might  have 
subsequently changed due to the credit crisis. 
Households  in  the  Netherlands  receive  a  net  favourable  fiscal  treatment 
through their possession of a home. In particular, they are allowed to deduct their 
mortgage loan payments from the income on which taxes are levied. In addition, they 
have to add fictitious income (based on the officially assessed value) as the result of 
the possession of a home. Some households also pay rents to the owner of the land the 
house is built on. This leads to a net fiscal advantage for homeowners of 177 euros 
per month (s.d. 383). This is around 4.8% of taxable household income. The net fiscal 
treatment is positive for 76% of the sample. Note that households, on average, deduct 
                                                 
49 To calculate aggregate figures for the Dutch economy, the sample outcomes are weighted by 
frequency weights.  The average weight is 123.7342 (s.d. 92.89). These weights are available in the 
dataset provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. They  
are created using an extensive list of population characteristics of the Netherlands. In particular, age, 
place in household, ethnicity, income, residence type and location indicators are used.  
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507 euros (s.d. 790) from their monthly taxable income, pay additional income tax of 
101 euros (s.d. 69) per month and pay land rents of 62 euros (s.d. 92) per month. 
Hence, the possibility of deducting mortgage loan payments  from taxable income 
explains a particularly large part of the net tax benefit.  
Based on the estimates in this paper (assumed to be policy invariant), it is 
possible to evaluate the effect of a change in the net tax benefit (abolishing favourable 
tax treatment). The loan-to-income ratio (i.e. income) is adjusted by the tax benefit 
per  individual,  which  resulted  in  a  higher  average  loan-to-income  ratio  of  1.8 
percentage points. However, note that around 50% of homeowners will only have a 
small or no change in the loan-to-income ratio (i.e. median of loan-to-income ratio 
change of 0.39 percentage points). Subsequently, the change in loan-to-income ratios 
are evaluated at the estimates in the absolute mark-up regression (i.e. 243.66 euros 
more mark-up after a percentage point increase in the loan-to-income ratio). Hence, 
the increase in loan-to-income ratio would increase the mark-up by 1.5 billion euros. 
Homeowners would also become less accurate. Although we cannot calculate the total 
amount of inaccuracy, the estimates suggest that this amount would increase by 2.0 
billion euros after removing the net tax benefit. These effects  are not  very large, 
especially given the fact that only a small proportion spills through within two years 
(i.e. only some households move within two years). In addition, note that the effect on 
turnover is marginal. The chance to move within two years would only decrease by 
0.2  percentage  points.  Note  that  these  estimates  do  not  take  into  account  effects 
though the general price level (i.e. reduction in demand) or second order effects of 
capital gains on turnover.     27 
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics, house prices and financial position 
Variables  Mean   Std.dev.  p25  p50   p75 
House prices           
Own house price valuation (Euros)  283,245    154,749  190,000  245,000  330,407 
Officially assessed value (Euros)  236,707  125,370  161,000  207,000  275,000 
Log (Officially assessed value)  12.2724  0.4358  11.9892  12.2405  12.5245 
Log (Own house price valuation)  12.4458  0.4478  12.1548  12.4090  12.7081 
Mark-up percentage [log own valuation –  log officially assessed value]  0.1734  0.1897  0.0655  0.1668  0.2852 
Mark-up absolute [own valuation –  officially assessed value]  46,539  69,617  13,300  35,000  67,000 










Absolute difference survey and officially assessed value 











Absolute percentage difference survey and official assessed value  











Original buy price (Euros)  130,513  103,590  63,529  107,546  174,705 
Capital gains 2003-2005 (based on price index NVM, Euros)   25,382  11,521  19,400  25,500  31,800 
Capital gains percentage [Capital gains 2003-2005/Original buy price]  0.4215  0.7368  0.1231  0.2231  0.4099 
Financial  Position           
Mortgage Loan payment To Taxable Household Income (fraction)  0.1554  0.1355  0.0614  0.1313  0.2174 
Mortgage Loan Payment (monthly, Euros)  539  453  232  490  750 
Taxable Household Income (monthly, Euros)  3,963  2,886  2,391  3,510  4,891 
Mortgage (Euros)   122,671  113,292  47,647  102,000  175,000 
Loan-to-Assessed Value (fraction)  0.5764  0.5143  0.2230  0.4940  0.8911 
Mortgage_nr (1 if number of mortgages=2, 0 if nr.= 0 or 1)  0.1311  0.3376  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype1 (1 if mortgage life insurance)  0.0686  0.2528  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype2 (1 if escrow mortgage)  0.1525  0.3595  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype3 (1 if investment mortgage)  0.0570  0.2317  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype4 (1 if no-payoff mortgage)  0.2711  0.4445  0  0  1 
Mortgagetype5 (1 if level payment (amortization) mortgage)  0.0478  0.2133  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype6 (1 if linear mortgage)  0.0146  0.1200  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype7 (1 if stocks mortgage)  0.0025  0.0495  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype8 (1 if other type of mortgage)  0.0118  0.1082  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype9 (1 if combination mortgage)  0.2420  0.4283  0  0  0 
Mortgagetype10 (1 if no mortgage)  0.1322  0.3387  0  0  0 
Remaining mortgage duration (years)  14.81  10.47  5  15  25 
Decision to move           
Want to move (1 if prefer to move)   b)  0.1756  0.3805  0  0  0 
Length of residence (years)    c)  14.52  12.43  5  11  21 
Number of observations  27,262         
Notes:  Only  the  condition  dummy=1  is  specified  with  the  implicit  understanding  0  otherwise.  All 
values are unweighted sample averages. a) the difference between survey and officially assessed value 
is based on 19,814 observations due to non-response. b) want to move=1 included respondents that, 
within 2 years: want to move; want to move, but cannot find a house; maybe want to move; already 
found a home; have to move. c) the length of residence is viewed as intrinsically related to the decision 
to move and as a consequence it is not included as an individual characteristic in the regressions.    
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, other individual and house characteristics  
Variables  Mean   Std.dev.  p25   p50  p75  
Other Individual characteristics           
Youngestchild0_5 (1 if child between 0 and 5)  0.1678  0.3737  0  0  0 
Nochild (1 if no child)  0.5536  0.4971  0  1  1 
Higheduc (1 if completed higher education)  0.3523  0.4777  0  0  1 
Female (1 if female)  0.5174  0.4997  0  1  1 
Household size (nr.)  2.661  1.228  2  2  4 
Householdtype1 (1 if partners without children)  0.3681  0.4823  0  0  1 
Householdtype2 (1 if partners with children)  0.4115  0.4921  0  0  1 
Householdtype3 (1 if partners with children and others)  0.0042  0.0645  0  0  0 
Householdtype4 (1 if partners with others)  0.0017  0.0410  0  0  0 
Householdtype5 (1 if single parent with children)  0.0304  0.1716  0  0  0 
Householdtype6 (1 if single parent with and with others)  0.0005  0.0227  0  0  0 
Householdtype7 (1 if other composition)  0.0077  0.0872  0  0  0 
Householdtype8 (1 if single)  0.1760  0.3808  0  0  0 
Age (years)  49.20  14.86  37  48  59 
House characteristics           
Size (m2)   a)  144.24  67.61  100  130  175 
Buildingyear1 (<1945)  0.2018  0.4014  0  0  0 
Buildingyear2 (>=1945 and <=1959)  0.0806  0.2723  0  0  0 
Buildingyear3 (>=1960 and <=1969)  0.1236  0.3291  0  0  0 
Buildingyear4 (>=1970 and <=1979)  0.1853  0.3886  0  0  0 
Buildingyear5 (>=1980 and <=1989)  0.1534  0.3603  0  0  0 
Buildingyear6 (>=1990 and <=1999)  0.1722  0.3776  0  0  0 
Buildingyear7 (>=2000)  0.0830  0.2760  0  0  0 
Houseclass1 (1 if detached)  0.1946  0.3959  0  0  0 
Houseclass2 (1 if semi-detached)  0.1890  0.3915  0  0  0 
Houseclass3 (1 if corner)  0.1455  0.3526  0  0  0 
Houseclass4 (1 if terraced)  0.3174  0.4655  0  0  1 
Houseclass5 (1 if other)  0.0125  0.1113  0  0  0 
Houseclass6 (1 if apartment)  0.1411  0.3480  0  0  0 
Distancetocentre1 (1 if in centre)  0.1342  0.3409  0  0  0 
Distancetocentre2  (1 if 15 min from centre)  0.4139  0.4925  0  0  1 
Distancetocentre3  (1 if >15)  0.1747  0.3797  0  0  0 
Distancetocentre4  (1 if suburb)  0.2279  0.4195  0  0  0 
Distancetocentre5  (1 if rural)  0.0493  0.2164  0  0  0 
Garden (1 if garden)  0.8547  0.3524  1  1  1 
Techmaintenance (1 if technical maintenance conducted 
within the last half year) 
0.2330  0.4226  0  0  0 
Nr. of zip codes   b)  2,606         
Nr. of months of questioning  8         
Number of observations  27,262         
Notes: Only the condition dummy=1 is specified with the implicit understanding 0 otherwise. All 
values are unweighted sample averages. a) In the regressions we use categorical size dummies. 
b) average observations per zip code: 10.46, before any selection there where 3495 zip codes.   29 
Table 3: Hedonic, mark-up and the decision to move regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Model type  Hedonic  Hedonic with  
individual 
characteristics 
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(1 if mortgage life insurance) 
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(1 if escrow mortgage) 










             
Mortgagetype3  
(1 if investment mortgage) 










             
Mortgagetype4  
(1 if no-payoff mortgage) 










             
Mortgagetype5  
(1 if level payment (amortization)  mortgage) 










             
Mortgagetype6  
(1 if linear mortgage) 










             
Mortgagetype7  
(1 if stocks mortgage) 










             
Mortgagetype8  
(1 if other mortgage) 










             
Mortgagetype 9  
(1 if combination mortgage) 










             










Other individual characteristics             
Youngestchild0_5  
(1 if child between 0-5) 










Nochild (1 if  no child)  -  0.008  -0.040  0.049  0.046  -0.251*** 
    (0.061)  (0.093)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.056) 
Higheduc 
 (1 if  completed higher education) 










Female (1 if female,)  -  0.020***  0.012***  0.008***  0.008***  -0.007 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Householdsize (nr.)  -  0.026***  0.022***  0.005**  0.005**  -0.005 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Householdtype2  
(1 if partners  with children) 











(1 if partners with children and others) 











(1 if partners with others) 











(1 if parent with children) 











(1 if parent with children and others) 











(1 if other composition) 











(1 if single) 










Age (years) /1000  -  9.593***  9.617***  -0.023  -0.126  -9.900*** 
    (0.867)  (0.823)  (0.601)  (0.597)  (1.137) 
Age_sq /1000  -  -0.056***  -0.055***  -0.001  0.002  0.056*** 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
House characteristics             
Size2 (1 if >50 and <=100 m2)  0.071***  0.061***  0.051***  0.010  0.008  0.009 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.016) 
Size3 (1 if >100 and <=150 m2)  0.177***  0.151***  0.133***  0.018**  0.016**  0.004 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015) 
Size4 (1 if >150 and <=200 m2)  0.273***  0.236***  0.206***  0.030***  0.028***  0.001   30 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.016) 
Size5 (1 if >200 and <=250 m2)  0.330***  0.290***  0.250***  0.040***  0.038***  -0.003 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.017) 
Size6 (1 if >250 and <=300 m2)  0.390***  0.348***  0.285***  0.063***  0.059***  0.002 
  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.019) 
Size7 (1 if >300 m2)  0.392***  0.354***  0.309***  0.044***  0.041***  -0.009 
  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.019) 
Buildingyear2 (1 if >=1945 and <=1959)  -0.036***  -0.040***  -0.023***  -0.017***  -0.018***  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
Buildingyear3 (1 if >=1960 and <=1969)  -0.028***  -0.034***  -0.010  -0.024***  -0.025***  0.021** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Buildingyear4 (1 if >=1970 and <=1979)  0.040***  0.025***  0.050***  -0.026***  -0.031***  0.020** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Buildingyear5 (1 if >=1980 and <=1989)  0.050***  0.046***  0.077***  -0.031***  -0.036***  0.012 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Buildingyear6 (1 if >=1990 and <=1999)  0.180***  0.174***  0.212***  -0.038***  -0.044***  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Buildingyear7 (1 if >=2000)  0.270***  0.264***  0.274***  -0.010  -0.016**  -0.040*** 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012) 
Houseclass2 (1 if semi-detached)  -0.321***  -0.302***  -0.287***  -0.015***  -0.014***  0.018** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Houseclass3 (1 if corner)  -0.483***  -0.450***  -0.462***  0.012**  0.014***  0.029*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Houseclass4 (1 if terraced)  -0.582***  -0.539***  -0.537***  -0.002  0.000  0.041*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
Houseclass5 (1 if other)  -0.202***  -0.188***  -0.192***  0.005  0.004  0.009 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.020) 
Houseclass6 (1 if apartment)  -0.699***  -0.638***  -0.650***  0.013  0.013  0.069*** 
  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015) 
Distancetocentre2(1 if 15 min from centre)  -0.032***  -0.027***  -0.004  -0.023***  -0.023***  -0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Distancetocentre3  (1 if >15)  -0.034***  -0.031***  -0.004  -0.026***  -0.026***  -0.005 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Distancetocentre4  (1 if suburb)  -0.007  -0.009  0.011  -0.020***  -0.020***  -0.013 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
Distancetocentre5  (1 if rural)  0.044***  0.036***  0.045***  -0.009  -0.009  -0.017 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
Garden (1 if garden)  0.062***  0.049***  0.057***  -0.009  -0.008  -0.023* 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.013) 
Techmaintenance  













             
Intercept  12.579***  12.183***  12.050***  0.133***  0.147***  0.749*** 
  (0.019)  (0.069)  (0.098)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.073) 
# explanatory variables  29  54  54  54  54  54 
Adjusted R-squared  0.48  0.51  0.56  0.02  0.02  0.03 
RMSE  0.26  0.25  0.22  0.17  0.17  0.35 
Joint Significance Tests             
F-value individual characteristics  -  56.80***  53.99***  6.49***  7.43***  25.18*** 
F-value house char. (without zip code fixed effect 
and month of questioning) 
545.93***  445.41***  454.23***  10.15***  10.40***  6.52*** 
Other tests             
Hausman test (chi2) for zip code fixed effects 
(H0: no difference fe, re) 
1235.07***  1021.18***  3355.55***  96.04***  108.76***  93.90*** 
F-value month of questioning  0.90  1.48  1.13  2.76***  2.63**  1.95* 
Notes: Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, *, 1%, 5%, 10% significance, 
respectively. Observations 27,262. In all specifications the 8 month of questioning dummies and 2,608 
zip code fixed effects were not reported and not included in the reported number of parameters. The 
reference category for mortgage type is no mortgage, for household type: partners without children, for 
size:<50, for buildingyear:<1945, for house class: detached, for distance to centre: in centre.  
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Table 4: Who lives where? Size versus household type 



























single  Total 
Size1 ( <50 m2)  0.82         0.75         0.01  0.00  0.08  0.00         0.04  0.95  2.65 
Size2 ( >50 and <=100 m2)  10.15         7.61         0.10  0.06  0.90  0.01         0.29         8.12  27.24  
Size3 ( >100 and <=150 m2)  14.07        16.24         0.14  0.08  1.18  0.01         0.22         5.24  37.19  
Size4 ( >150 and <=200 m2)  6.96         9.82         0.09  0.01  0.49  0.01         0.11         1.80  19.31 
Size5 ( >200 and <=250 m2)  2.51         3.52         0.03  0.01  0.23  0.01         0.04         0.76  7.11 
Size6 ( >250 and <=300 m2)  1.20         1.84         0.03  0.00  0.06  0.00         0.02         0.37  3.51  
Size7 ( >300 m2)  1.09         1.36         0.02  0.01  0.11  0.00         0.04         0.36  2.99  
Totals  36.81        41.15         0.42  0.17  3.04  0.05         0.77        17.60  100.00  
 
Notes: relative frequencies are reported. 
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-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Percentage Markup
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0190
Kernel density estimate
 
Notes: based on the Epanechnikov kernel. Optimal bandwidth  
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Mortgage Loan Payment To Taxable Household Income
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0135
Kernel density estimate
 
Notes: based on the Epanechnikov kernel. Optimal bandwidth  
based on minimized mean integrated squared error. The  
loan-to-income ratio was not allowed to be larger than 1.  
Negative and zero income were excluded.   34 


































-200000 -100000 0 100000 200000
Survey Assessed Value minus Official Assessed Value
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth =  2.1e+03
Kernel density estimate
 
Notes: based on the Epanechnikov kernel. Optimal bandwidth  
based on minimized mean integrated squared error. The  
values were constrained between -200,000 and 200,000.  
   35 
Figure 4: Kernel regression mark-up on the loan-to-income ratio 
 






Notes: based on the Epanechnikov kernel. Bandwidth 0.05.  
15 equally spaced points. A loan-to-income ratio below 0.4  
captures most observations (i.e more than 95%). Using the  
whole range of the loan-to-income results in a highly volatile  
estimate after 0.4 (resembling a S-curve) due to the low  
number of observations. 